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Abstract 
A nonmonotonic logic of thresholded gener­
alizations is presented. Given propositions 
a and {3 from a language L and a posi­
tive integer k, the thresholded generalization 
a =}k {3 means that the conditional prob­
ability 1r(f3!a) is at least 1 - 7jl8k. A two­
level probability structure is defined. At the 
lower level, a model is defined to be a prob­
ability function on L. At the upper level, 
there is a probability distribution over mod­
els. A definition is given of what it means 
for a collection of thresholded generaliza­
tions to entail another thresholded general­
ization. This nonmonotonic entailment re­
lation, called entailment in probability, has 
the feature that its conclusions are proba­
bilistically trustworthy meaning that, given 
true premises, it is improbable that an en­
tailed conclusion would be false. A proce­
dure is presented for ascertaining whether 
any given collection of premises entails any 
given conclusion. It is shown that entailment 
in probability is closely related to Goldszmidt 
and Pearl's System-z+, thereby demonstrat­
ing that System-Z+'s conclusions are proba­
bilistically trustworthy. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 GENERALIZATIONS 
By a generalization is meant any statement of the type: 
Nearly everything that has property a also has property 
{3. Examples: (a) Nearly every animal t hat has feath­
ers is capable of flight. (b) On nearly every occasion 
when I turn the key in my car ignition, the car st arts. 
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tusually abbreviated as NRaD. 
In a logic of generalizations, collections of premises 
which are generalizations entail conclusions which are 
also generalizations. Why is a logic of generalizations 
needed? Why does one need to infer new, previously 
unknown, generalizations from already known general­
izations? The reason is that the known generalizations 
may not be adequate to give unambiguous answers to 
questions about individual objects. 
For example, suppose that, among the known general­
izations, are: 
(i) Nearly everything that has property a also has 
property J. 
(ii) Nearly everything that has property f] also has 
property not---y. 
If all that is known about an object o is that it has 
property a, then it should be concluded that, in all 
probability, o has property --y. But what if it is known 
that o has both property o: and property {3 (and 
nothing more is known about o)? What should be 
concluded then?1 By the principle of total evidence 
(Schurz, 1994), the conclusion that o has property 'Y 
should be accepted as probably true if and only if it is 
known that: 
(iii) Nearly everything having properties a and {3 also 
has property 'Y· 
Thus, it is desired to know whether (iii) is true, but 
(iii) is not one of the known generalizations. This 
illustrates why a logic of generalizations is needed. The 
generalization (iii) should be judged to be true if and 
only if it is entailed by the known generalizations. 
1.2 THRESHOLDED GENERALIZATIONS 
The exception rate for a generalization Nearly every­
thing that has property a also has property {3 is defined 
to be one minus the conditional probability of {3 given 
1This is a version of the reference class problem (Bac­
chus, Grove, Halpern & Koller, 1992). 
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a:. A generalization is said to be thresholded if it is ac­
companied by the the information that its exception 
rate is less than some particular threshold. 
It is useful to threshold generalizations for two rea­
sons. F irst, it helps in gauging how much confidence 
to place in inferences about individual objects. Thus, 
suppose that all that is known about an object o is that 
it has property a:. Given the generalization Nearly ev­
erything that has property a: also has property (3, how 
confident should one be that o has property (3? The 
answer is that, the smaller the generalization's thresh­
old, the more confidence one may have. Second, the 
thresholds attached to premises affect what conclu­
sions are entailed by them. For example, whether or 
not the generalizations (i) and (ii) entail the general­
ization (iii) depends upon the thresholds attached to 
(i) and (ii). If (i)'s threshold is much smaller than 
(ii) 's threshold, then (iii) will be entailed; otherwise, 
it will not be entailed. 
A nonmonotonic logic of thresholded generalizations 
will be described in this paper. 
2 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 
In this paper, object properties will be represented by 
propositions in a propositional language. 
Let [. be a propositional language constructed from the 
primitive propositions cr1, . . . , O"r and the connectives 
and 1\, or V, not ....,, and possibly additional connec­
tives. Let t be an abbreviation for cr1 V ...,0"1 and let f 
be an abbreviation for cr1 1\ -,cr1. An atom is a propo­
sition of the form <;1 1\ · · · 1\ \r where each \i is either 
O"i or 'O"i. Thus, there are 2" atoms in £. Let a: f= (3 
mean that a entails (3 and let of= =9/3 mean that a 
and (3 are equivalent. 
Because propositions in £ represent properties of ob­
jects, they will be called properties. Thus, an object 
has property a: 1\ (3 if and only if it has property a: and 
property (3. The properties a: V (3 and -,a: are inter­
preted analogously. Furthermore, the property t is the 
universal property possessed by every object and the 
property f is the impossible property possessed by no 
object. 
Suppose 1r is a probability function on £. Thus, if 
a: E £, 1r( a:) may be interpreted as the probability of a 
randomly selected object having property a:. For any 
a:, (3 E £, define 
and 
7r (/31o:) = 7r(O: (\ (3)j1f(o:) if 7r(o:) > 0 (1) 
7r(/31o:) = 1 if rr(o:) = 0. 2 (2) 
2The convention expressed by Eq. 2 is controversial. 
Thus, Adams adopted this convention in the papers 
(Adams, 1966, 1986) but not in his book (Adams, 1975). 
McGee (1994) has proposed an alternative to this conven­
tion. The convention expressed by Eq. 2 was adopted in 
Also, define 
Then, rr* ( -,f31o:) is the exception rate for the general­
izati 1n Nearly everything that has property a: also has 
property (3. Note that 1r* ( -,f31o:) equals r, ( -,f31o:) unless 
1r (o:) = 0, in which case rr*(-,f31o:) equals zero. 
In practice, we seldom know the exact value of 
1r* ( -,f31 o:) . Instead, what we know is some estimate 
1r* ( -,f31 o:)e�t of the exception rate. Typically, 
(3) 
where 1./J is some unknown positive number which we 
hope is not very far from one. The unknown value of 
1./J is not fixed, but may vary from one generalization 
to another. 
Let 8 be a small positive number. Let 81, 82, . . . and 
800 = 0 be a collection of thresholds that have been 
adopted. 
A thresholded generalization is a syntactic object hav­
ing the form 
0: =}k (3 
where a: and (3 are any properties in [. and where k is 
any positive integer or oo. The meaning of a =?k (3 is 
that 
(4) 
Thus, from Eqs. 3 and 4, it is seen that a: =?k (3 means 
that 
(5) 
where 1./J is an unknown positive number which we hope 
is not very far from one. 
2.1 ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION 
As discussed above, propositions in £ are interpreted 
here as properties of objects and 7r(/31o:) is interpreted 
as the conditional probability of an object having the 
property (3 given that it has the property a:. Alter­
natively, propositions in £ may be interpreted as as­
sertions of fact and 7r(f31o:) may be interpreted as the 
conditional probability of the assertion (3 being true 
given that the assertion a: is true. The logic presented 
in this paper is appropriate for either of the above in­
terpretations. 
Thresholded generalizations resemble conditional 
statements in Adams' (1966, 1975, 1986) logic of con­
ditionals. An Adams conditional is a syntactic object 
of the form a: --+ (3 where a: and (3 are are propositions. 
Its meaning is that 7r(/31o:) is close to one, where a and 
(3 are interpreted as assertions. 
this paper for the following reason: The logic presented 
in this paper is intended for use in applications where 
rr(o:) = 0 only if the set of objects having p roperty a is 
empty. Consequently, Eq. 2 guarantees that rr(/11o:) = 1 if 
and only if the objects having property a are a subset of 
the objects having property /3. 
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2.2 GOALS 
This paper has two major goals. The first goal is to 
formulate a nonmonotonic entailment relation, to be 
called entailment in probability, for thresholded gener­
alizations. As a stepping stone toward the definition of 
entailment in probability, a monotonic entailment re­
lation called entailment with certainty will be defined. 
The second goal is to find a procedure for ascertain­
ing whether any given collection of premises and any 
given conclusion satisfy the definition of entailment in 
probability. 
3 ENTAILMENT CRITERIA 
Classical logic uses the following criterion for entail­
ment. 
Criterion 1 (Classical) For a set of premises to en­
tail a conclusion, it should be impossible for the con­
clusion to be false when the premises are true. Thus, 
every model of the premises should be a model of the 
conclusion. In short, any entailed conclusion should 
be trustworthy. 
Any entailment relation that satisfies this classical cri­
terion will necessarily be monotonic. 
Since a nonmonotonic entailment relation cannot sat­
isfy the classical criterion for entailment, what crite­
rion should it satisfy instead? Instead of adopting 
some new criterion that is unrelated to the classical 
criterion, it makes sense to adopt a modified form of 
the classical criterion. The following weakened form of 
the classical criterion is proposed as a sensible criterion 
for nonmonotonic entailment. 
Criterion 2 (Modified Classical) For a set of 
premises to entail a conclusion, it should be im­
probable that the conclusion would be false when the 
premises are true. Thus, nearly every model of the 
premises should be a model of the conclusion. In 
short, any entailed conclusion should be probabilisti­
cally trustworthy . 
Most of our everyday reasoning does not satisfy the 
classical criterion for entailment. We continually leap 
to conclusions that are not fully certain given the 
premises from which we are reasoning. Indeed our rea­
soning would be virtually paralyzed if we used only the 
classical criterion for entailment. Perhaps, in our ev­
eryday reasoning, we frequently use the modified clas­
sical criterion. 
As formulated above, the modified classical criterion is 
imprecise. It shall be one of the goals of this paper to 
rigorously and precisely define a nonmonotonic entail­
ment relation that embodies the spirit of the modified 
classical cr iterion. 
4 MONOTONIC ENTAILMENT 
We will now work toward defining, first, a monotonic 
entailment relation and, later, a nonmonotonic entail­
ment relation for thresholded generalizations. Recall 
that the thresholded generalization a �k (3 means 
that 
1 � 7r(tJ[et) :s: 'ljl6k 
where 6 is a positive number close to zero and 'ljJ is 
a positive number that we hope is not very far from 
one. The definitions of these entailment relations will 
be idealizations in two ways. First, because 6 is close to 
zero, the definitions will involve looking at asymptotes 
as b goes to zero. Second, because the value of 'ljJ 
is unknown, the definitions will not depend upon 'ljJ 
having any particular value or range of values. 
4.1 MODELS 
Definition 3 A model is a probability function on .C. 
Let M denote the set of all models. Suppose that 1r 
is a model and that 'ljJ > 0 and 6 > 0. Then 7T satis­
fies the thresholded generalization a �k (3 under the 
parameters ( 'ljJ, b) if and only if 
1 � K(;J[n) � 'ljlbk. 
Define M'l,i,,o(a �k 8) to be the set of models that 
satisfy a �k (3 under the parameters ('1/J, 6). 
Notation 4 Throughout the remainder of this paper, 
let A denote the set of m 2: 0 thresholded generaliza­
tions: 
A= {nl '*k1 tJ1,· · · ,Ctm =?k"' f3m}· 
Definition 5 Let W denote the vector ( 'ljJ1, .. . , '1/Jm). 
Call W a positive parameter vector if '1/Ji > 0 for i 
= 
1, ... , m. For any positive parameter vector W and 
any b > 0, define Mq;,8(A) to be the intersection of 
M with each of Mw,,o(ai �k, (3i), i = 1, ... ,m. 
4.2 CONSISTENCY 
Abbreviation 6 Let S(6) be any statement involving 
6. Throughout this paper, (a) and (b) will be used as 
abbreviations for (c). 
(a) For small b, S(b). 
(b) S(6) for small b. 
(c) There exists a 6. > 0 such that, for all positive 
6 <;:: 6., S(b). 
Proposition/Definition 7 Either (a) or (b) is 
true. 
(a) For every positive parameter vector W and every 
positive 6, Mq;,6(A) is not empty. In this case, A is said to be consistent. 
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(b) For every positive parameter vector qi, M,jj,6(A) 
is empty for small 8. In this case, A is said to be 
inconsistent. 
(Space limitations preclude giving proofs here. Proofs 
will appear in the full version of this paper.) 
4.3 ENTAILMENT WITH CERTAINTY 
Definition 8 (Standard Definition) Suppose g( ·) 
and h( · ) are non-negative functions defined on an open 
interval (0, a). Suppose that there exists a 'lj; > 0 such 
that, for small 15, 
h(o) � .,Pg(l5). 
Then, 
h(8) = O[g(o)J . 
Definition 9 A entails "( =>j ( with certainty (de­
noted A Fe "( =>j () if either (a) or (b). 
(a) A is consistent and, for every positive parameter 
vector qi, 
sup [1- 7r((l"f)] = 0(15J). (6) 
7rEM.J;�(A) 
(b) A is inconsistent. 
Proposition 10 A entails "( =>j ( with certainty if, 
for every positive parameter vector qi, there exists a 
'lj; > 0 such that 
(7) 
for small 15. 
Loosely speaking, Proposition 10 says that A entails 
"( =:}j ( with certainty if and only if every model that 
satisfies A also satisfies 'Y =>j (. Also, this proposition 
implies that entailment with certainty is monotonic. 
Theorem 11 does not provide a complete characteriza­
tion of entailment with certainty. For example, 
but that fact cannot be derived from Theorem 11. 
Entailment with certainty will not be fully character­
ized here. It has been introduced primarily as a step­
ping stone toward the definition of a nonmonotonic 
entailment relation to be called entailment in proba­
bility. 
5 NONMONOTONIC 
ENTAILMENT 
A nonmonotonic entailment relation for thresholded 
generalizations will now be constructed by taking the 
requirements for monotonic entailment and making 
them less stringent. Loosely speaking, instead of re­
quiring a conclusion to be satisfied by every model 
that satisfies the premises, it will only be required 
that the conclusion be satisfied by nearly every model 
that satisfies the premises. This strategy for defin­
ing a nonmonotonic entailment relation is inspired 
by the random-worlds and random-structures meth­
ods (Bacchus, Grove, Halpern & Koller, 1992, 1993, 
1996; Grove, Halpern & Koller, 1994, 1996a, 1996b). 
5.1 PROBABILITY ORDER 
The concept of probability order and the notation Op( · ) 
were introduced by Mann and Wald (194;)) and elab­
orated by Chernoff (1956) and Pratt (1959). A nice 
tutorial is presented by Bishop, Fienberg and Holland 
(1975, Sections 14.2 & 14.4). 
Definition 12 Suppose that, for each 15 in an open 
interval (O,a), X(15) is a non-negative random variable 
and g(o) is non-negative number. Suppose that, for 
each TJ > 0, there exists a 1jJ > 0 such that, for small 
15, 
Pr[X(b) � 1/Jg(8)]?: 1 -ry. 
4.4 ADAMS' LOGIC OF CONDITIONALS Then, 
Entailment with certainty is closely related to entail­
ment in Adams' (1966) logic of conditionals. Using 
results of Adams including Meta-metatheorems 1 and 
2 of Adams (1986), the following result can be proven. 
Theorem 11 Suppose that k1, ... , km, where m ?: 0, 
are all finite. If 
j �min{ oo, k1, . . .  , km}, 
then A entails "( =>j ( with certainty if and only if, in 
Adams' (1966) logic of conditionals, 
entails 'Y -+ (. 
X(o) = Op[g(b)]. 
Proposition 13 Define the inverse cumulative distri­
bution function of the non-negative random variable 
X(8) as follows. For each 77 > 0, let 
cdfx toP - TJ) = inf{x?: 0 :  Pr[X(b) � x]?: 1- 77} 
Then, X(o) = Op [g(l5)] if and only if, for each 1] > 0, 
cdf_xto)(1- TJ) = O[g(b)]. 
5.2 MODELS AS VECTORS 
Following Nilsson (1986) and Paris (1994, pp. 13-14), 
probability functions may be represented as points in 
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a finite-dimensional space. Recall that the language .C 
contains 2r atoms. Therefore, to specify a probabil­
ity function (i.e., model) 1r on C, it suffices to spec­
ify the value of 1r(at) for each atom at E C. There­
fore, any model may be represented by a vector in 2r­
dimensional space. The components of such a vector 
will all be non-negative and will sum to one. The set 
of models M is represented by a (2r- I)-dimensional 
polytope, namely, the convex hull of the 2r unit axis 
vectors. 
These two views of models will be used interchange­
ably throughout this paper. Sometimes a model will 
be considered to be a probability function and some­
times a vector. 
If each model in M-fi,8(A) is considered to be a vector, 
then it can be shown that the set of vectors M>ii,6(A) 
is a convex polytope in 2r -dimensional space. Its di­
mension is at most 2r - 1. 
Definition 14 If the polytope M>ii,6(A) is not empty, 
let J.d , denote the uniform probability measure on W,v 
M�.6(A). Let II�,o be a random vector that has dis-
tribution p.�,o. 
Because vectors are used here to represent models, 
II$ ti may be viewed as being a random model. Thus, 
we 'are dealing with two levels of probabilities. At the 
lower level, each model is a probability function. At 
the upper level, there is a probability distribution over 
models.3 
5.3 ENTAILMENT IN PROBABILITY 
We want to define entailment in probability so that, 
loosely speaking, A entails ""( =;,1 ( in probability if and 
only if nearly every model that satisfies each thresh­
olded generalization in A also satisfies ""( =;,1 (. 
W hen is one justified in asserting that nearly every 
model in M>ii 6(A) has some particular attribute C 
There are two' cases to consider. First, suppose that 
A is consistent and, therefore, M>ii)A) is not empty. 
If the probability that the random model II� , has W,v 
attribute � is close to one, then it is reasonable to say 
that nearly every model in M$,6(A) has attribute �· 
3This method of adopting a uniform distribution over 
models is similar to the random-structures method (Bac­
chus, Grove, Halpern & Koller, 1992; Grove, Halpern & 
Koller, 1996a, 1996b). In this method, a structure is an 
allocation of N � 1 indistinguishable objects among 2r 
atoms. Thus, a structure may be represented by a vector 
of 2r non-negative integers that sum to N. Each struc­
ture is assigned equal probability. Let XN denote a ran­
domly selected structure. As N --> oo, the distribution of 
XN / N approaches a uniform distribution. The goal of the 
random-structures method is to find the asymptotic condi­
tional probability of a sentence <p being satisfied given that 
a sentence () was satisfied. 
Second, suppose that A inconsistent and, therefore, 
M�.6(A) is empty for small 8. Then, every model in 
M>ii,6(A) has the attribute �· 
In the following definition, since II�
,Ii 
is a random 
model, the conditional probability II�<((/"/) is a ran-w,u 
dom variable. 
Definition 15 A entails ""( =?1 ( in probability (de­
noted A FP ""( =;,J (}if either (a) or (b). 
(a) A is consistent and, for every positive parameter 
vector�, 
(8) 
(b) A is inconsistent. 
Proposition 16 A entails ""( =;,J ( in probability if 
and only if either (a) or (b). 
(a) A is consistent and, for every positive parameter 
vector � and ever y TJ > 0, there exists a 1/J > 0 
such that 
for small6. 
(b) .A is inconsistent. 
Loosely speaking, Proposition 16 says that A entails 
""( =;,1 ( in probability if and only if nearly every model 
that satisfies A also satisfies "/ =?J (. Not surprisingly, 
it turns out that entailment in probability is nonmono­
tonic. 
Definition 15 and Proposition 16 which define and 
characterize entailment in probability are stochastic 
analogs of Definition 9 and Proposition 10 which de­
fine and characterize entailment with certainty. Thus, 
Eq. 8 is the stochastic analog of Eq. 6 and Eq. 9 is the 
stochastic analog of Eq. 7. 
5.4 ROBUSTNESS 
In essence, the definition of entailment in probability 
is Bayesian. 
Recall that the set M of all models is a polytope in 
2r -dimensional space. The dimension of M � 6 (A) may 
decrease as 6 goes to zero. Let F denote the lowest­
dimension face of M-see Webster ( 1994, pp. 79-80) 
for the definition of face-that eventually contains 
M>ii 6(A) as[; goes to zero. Let ft denote the uniform 
dist�ibution on .F. Then, for small 8, Eq. 9 may be 
rewritten with a posterior probability on the left-hand 
side: 
�-t[M,p,cb =;,J ()IM-ii,o(A)];::: 1- r;. (10) 
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If the definition of entailment in probability were based 
upon Eq. 10, how robust would the definition be over 
changes in the prior distribution IL? If !l were not 
uniform, would the entailment relation change? 
It can be shown that, if f-1 is quasi-uniform in the sense 
that its density has a lower bound greater than zero 
and an upper bound less than infinity, then the entail­
ment relation will be unchanged. 
In at least some cases, choices of f-1 that are not quasi­
uniform leave the entailment relation unchanged. An 
example can be constructed as follows. Imagine ex­
tending the propositional language C from having r 
primitive propositions to a language c· having a larger 
number r+s of primitive propositions. Let M* denote 
the set of all models for £*. Any model in M • may 
be converted to a model in M by the appropriate pro­
jection from 2r+s -dimensional space to 2r -dimensional 
space. This projection carries a uniform distribution 
on M* to a Dirichlet distribution on M and this lat­
ter distribution is not quasi-uniform. But, it follows 
from Theorem 27 below that entailment in probability 
is language independent. Therefore, if this particular 
Dirichlet distribution were chosen as a prior distribu­
tion on M, the resulting entailment relation would be 
unchanged. 
5.5 DEGREE OF RARITY 
The next definition defines degree of rarity in terms 
of entailment with certainty and the succeeding two 
theorems relate degree of rarity to consistency and to 
entailment in probability. 
Definition 17 For any property p E £, define its de­
gree of rarity under A by: 
r.A(p) =max [{0} U {k:::; oo: A f=c t =?k 'P}]. 
Theorem 18 If A is consistent, then r_A(t) = 0. On 
the other hand, if A is inconsistent, then r.A (t) = oo. 
Theorem 19 A FP 1 =?J ( if and only if 
r.A(r A'();:: r_A(J) + j.4 (11) 
Theorem 19 is the key result upon which later theo­
rems concerning entailment in probability are based. 
Theorem 19 is proved by showing that Eq. 8 of Defini­
tion 15 is equivalent to a statement about the support 
function (Webster, 1994) of the polytope M*.6(A) 
6 DECISION PROCEDURE 
6.1 DEPTH ENTAILMENT DEFINED 
Depth entailment appears, at first, to be a new kind 
of entailment but it turns out to be equivalent to en­
tailment in probability. 
4This paper uses the convention that oo 2 h+ j if either 
or both of hand j is oo. 
Definition 20 A function d that maps C into the 
non-negative integers plus oo is called a depth func­
tion if, for every a, fJ E C, 
• d(a) :2: d(fJ) if a f= (3. 
• d(av fJ) = min{d(a) , d(fJ)}. 
• d(f) = 00. 
A depth function d satisfies a thresholded generaliza­
tion ')' =?j ( if and only if 
(12) 
A depth function satisfies a collection of thresholded 
generalizations if and only if it satisfies every member 
of the collection. 
Proposition 21 There exists a unique depth func­
tion, denoted dA, that satisfies A and such that, if 
d is any other depth function that satisfies A, then 
d.Ab) ::; d(t) for every')' E £. The quantity dA(r) is 
called the exception depth of')' under A. 
Definition 22 A depth entails 1 =?j ( (denoted 
A Fd /' =?j (} if and only if dA satisfies I' =?j (. 
6.2 TESTING FOR DEPTH ENTAILMENT 
Definition 23 The exceptions to A at depth d and 
beyond, denoted �A(d), will be defined inductively. For 
d = 0, -1, -2, · · · , -oo, let �A(d) = t. Next, suppose 
that d is a positive integer and that �A ( d') has been de­
fined for every integer d' < d. Then, fori = 1, ... , m, 
let 
Then, let 
if ai f= �.A(d- ki); 
otherwise. 
�A (d) = f V !11 (d) V · · · V Vm (d). 
Proposition/Definition 24 �A(d') f= �A(d) when­
ever d' > d. There exists a smallest non-negative inte­
ger D such that �A(D')f= =1�A(D) whenever D' >D. 
Moreover, if 
k = max[{1} U {K # oo: K = ki for some i}], 
then D is the smallest non-negative integer such that 
(13) 
Define 
Proposition 25 For any property p E C, 
dA(P) = max{d :::; oo: P f= �A(d)}. 
5Note the similarity to Eq. 11. 
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Consequently, it is straightforward to test whether A 
depth entails 'Y ==;..J (. Follow the procedure in Defi­
nition 23 to find �A(O), �A(l), .... Stop the procedure 
when an integer D that satisfies Eq. 13 is found. Then, 
use Proposition 25 to find dA ( 1/\ ->() and dA ( 1). F i­
nally, check whether Eq. 12 holds. 
6.3 TESTING FOR ENTAILMENT IN 
PROBABILITY 
Exception depth and degree of rarity are the same 
thing. 
Proposition 26 For any property p E £, 
Therefore, entailment in probability and depth entail­
ment are the same thing. 
Theorem 27 A FP 1 ==;..i ( if and only if A Fd 
I '*j (. 
Thus, the procedure for ascertaining depth entailment 
is also a procedure for ascertaining entailment in prob­
ability. 
7 RELATION TO SYSTEM-z+ 
Goldszmidt and Pearl (1991, 1992; Pearl, 1994) for­
mulated a System-z+ for reasoning with default rules 
having varying strengths. In System-z+, a rule has 
the form o: � (3 where o: and (3 are propositions and 
k is a non-negative integer. According to Pearl (1994, 
p. 58), the meaning of o: � (3 is that 
where E is a positive number close to zero. Comparing 
the above equation with Eq. 5, it is evident that the 
default rule o: � (3 and the thresholded generalization 
o: *"+1 f3 have essentially the same meaning. 
Given any context D. of default rules and an integer 
k 2 0, Goldszmidt and Pearl (1992, Footnote 4) de-
fined a consequence relation i": between propositions. 
Thus, given the default rules D., o:i":f3 means that (3 
follows from o: and is endorsed with strength k. 
Goldszmidt and Pearl constructed the consequence re­
lations i":, k = 0, 1, . . . , by applying an intuitively ap­
pealing principle that might be called minimization of 
surprise. Default rules may be interpreted as saying 
that certain things are surprising. Thus, the default 
rule o: � (3 implies that, if the proposition o: is ob­
served, then it is surprising to also observe the propo­
sition --.(3 and, the larger k is, the greater the surprise. 
Roughly speaking, Goldszmidt and Pearl showed that 
there is a way of minimizing the surprise attached to 
every proposition while still maintaining the surprise 
required by the default rules. They then defined li"�( 
to mean that, having observed the proposition 1 in this 
minimally surprising condition, one would be surprised 
to degree j to also observe the proposition --.(. 
System-z+ is closely related to depth entailment. Re­
call that 
Let 
Theorem 28 Assume that k1, ... , km and j are all 
positive and finite. Assume further that 0:1, . . . , O:m 
and (31, ... , f3m and 1 and ( are all not equivalent to 
f. Finally, assume that, for any proposition p, A Fd 
t => = --.p only if p f= f. 6 Then, the following two 
statements are equivalent. 
. 1 
(b) Given the default rules Az+ as context, 1i"�- (. 
The basis for the above theorem is that Goldszmidt 
and Pearl's (1991) Theorem 3 and Corollary 2 imply 
that their ranking function r;;+ is essentially equivalent 
to this paper's depth function dA. Thus , this paper's 
definition of depth entailment is essentially an appli­
cation of the principle of minimization of surprise. 
In view of the close relation between entailment in 
probability, depth entailment, and System-z+, readers 
wishing to know about the properties of inference in 
these systems, the complexity of inference, and to see 
examples should consult Goldszmidt and Pearl(1991, 
1992). 
7.1 WHAT'S NEW IN THIS PAPER? 
This paper started by proposing a symbolic language 
having a syntax and semantics similar to that of 
System-z+. The paper went on to develop the depth 
entailment relation which, except for special cases, is 
equivalent to the consequence relations in System-z+. 
So, what is new in this paper? 
There are two new developments. The first new devel­
opment was that entailment in probability was defined 
(Definition 15) so that it embodied the modified clas­
sical criterion for entailment. This criterion asserts 
a clearly desirable feature for a nonmonotonic entail­
ment relation: Its conclusions should be probabilisti­
cally trustworthy meaning that, given true premises, 
any entailed conclusions should be unlikely to be false. 
Definition 15 guarantees that conclusions entailed in 
probability are probabilistically trustworthy. 
6The purpose of this requirement is to guarantee that 
Az+ is consistent as defined by Goldszmidt and Pearl 
(1991, Definition 4). 
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But, it is not enough to merely define a nonmonotonic 
entailment relation whose conclusions are probabilisti­
cally trustworthy. Also needed is a decision procedure 
for ascertaining whether any given conclusion is en­
tailed by any given collection of premises. However, 
from the definition of entailment in probability, it's 
not obvious what a decision procedure for it would be. 
In marked contrast to entailment in probability, the 
definition of depth entailment leads straightforwardly 
to a decision procedure. However, the drawback to 
depth entailment was that it could only be justified by 
the minimization-of-surprise principle. Although this 
principle is intuitively appealing, the principle itself 
is hard to justify. Moreover, this principle does not 
seem to guarantee the probabilistic trustworthiness of 
entailed conclusions. 
The second new development in this paper was the 
demonstration (Theorem 27) that entailment in prob­
ability is identical to depth entailment. By asserting 
the identity of these two types of entailment, Theo­
rem 27 simultaneously provides the missing decision 
procedure for entailment in probability and a stronger 
justification for depth entailment. 
In addition, given the close relation between System­
z+ and depth entailment, Theorem 27 also puts 
System-z+ on a more sound footing and shows that 
its conclusions are probabilistically trustworthy. 
Acknowledgments 
In thinking about the issues discussed in this paper, I 
have been greatly helped by the comments of Ernest 
Adams and Joseph Halpern. 
References 
Adams, E. W. (1966). Probability and the logic of 
conditionals. In Hintikka, J. & Suppes, P. (editors), 
Aspects of Inductive Logic. Pp. 265-316. North Hol­
land Publishing, Amsterdam. 
Adams, E. W. (1975). The Logic of Conditionals. D. 
Reidel, Dordrecht, Netherlands. 
Adams, E. W. (1986). On the logic of high probability. 
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15, 255-279. 
Bacchus, F., Grove, A. J., Halpern, J. Y., & Koller, D. 
(1992). From statistics to belief. In Proceedings of the 
Tenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
(AAAI-92), pp. 602-608. 
Bacchus, F., Grove, A. J., Halpern, J. Y., & Koller, D. 
(1993). Statistical foundations for default reasoning. 
In Proceedings of the 13th International Joint Con­
ference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-93), Vol. 1, 
pp. 563-569. 
Bacchus, F., Grove, A. J., Halpern, J. Y., & Koller, D. 
(1996). From statistical knowledge bases to degrees of 
belief. Artificial Intelligence, in press. 
Bishop, Y. M. M., Fienberg, S. E. & Holland, P. W. 
(1975). Discrete Multivariate Analysis: Theory and 
Practice. M.LT. Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Chernoff, H. (1956). Large sample theory: Parametric 
case. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 27, 1-·22. 
Goldszmidt, M. & Pearl, J. (1991). System-Z+: A for­
malism for reasoning with variable strength defaults. 
In Proceedings of the Ninth National Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-91)., VoL 1, pp. 399-404. 
Goldszmidt, M. & Pearl, J. (1992). Reasoning with 
qualitative probabilities can be tractable. In Proceed­
ings of the Eighth Conference on Uncertainty in Arti­
ficial Intelligence (UAI-92). Pp. 112-120. 
Grove, A. J., Halpern, J. Y., & Koller, D. (1994). Ran­
dom worlds and maximum entropy. Journal of Artifi­
cial Intelligence Research, 2, 33-88. 
Grove, A. J., Halpern, J. Y., & Koller, D. (1996a). 
Asymptotic conditional probabilities: The unary case. 
SIAM Journal on Computing, 25, 1-51. 
Grove, A. J., Halpern, J. Y., & Koller, D. (1996b). 
Asymptotic conditional probabilities: The non-unary 
case. Jo1.1rnal of Symbolic Logic, 61, 25Q-276. 
Mann, H. B. & Wald, A. (1943). On stochastic 
limit and order relationships. Annals of Mathemati­
cal Statistics, 14, 217-226. 
McGee, V. (1994). Learning the impossible. In Eells, 
E. & Skyrms, B. (editors), Probability and Condition­
als: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Pp. 179-
199. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Nilsson, N. J. (1986). Probabilistic logic. Artificial 
Intelligence, 28, 71-87. 
Paris, J. B. (1994). The uncertain reasoner's compan­
ion. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Pearl, J. (1994). From Adams' conditionals to default 
expressions, causal conditionals, and counterfactuals. 
In Eells, E. & Skyrms, B. (editors), Probability and 
Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. 
Pp. 47-74. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Pratt, J. W. (1959). On a general concept of "in prob­
ability". Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 30, 549-
558. 
Schurz, G. (1994). Probabilistic justification of default 
reasoning. In Knebel, B. & Dreschler-Fischer, L. D. 
(editors), KI-94: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. 
Proceedings 18th German Annual Conference on Ar­
tificial Intelligence. Pp. 248-259. Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin. 
Webster, R. J. (1994). Convexity. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
